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 Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July, 1984)
 CONTINUUM AND FINITE-PLAYER NONCOOPERATIVE
 MODELS OF COMPETITION
 BY EDWARD J. GREEN'
 The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncoop-
 erative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The
 nonatomic game has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations. This
 paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit
 of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of
 equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is
 analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY is an attempt to explain and analyze behavior in
 two kinds of situations which are markedly different from one another. The first
 kind of situation consists of conflicts among a small group of agents, each of
 whom can make unilateral decisions which may significantly affect the welfare of
 the others as well as his own welfare. Card games with high stakes and battles
 between opposing generals are canonical examples of such conflict. The second
 kind of situation is characterized by the individualistic but not deliberately
 adversary behavior of a large number of agents, none of whom alone is able to
 affect the circumstances of anyone except himself but whose actions in the
 aggregate determine the environment in which all must live. The canonical
 examples of this latter sort of anonymous interaction are, of course, competitive
 markets.
 Noncooperative game theory has been largely a theory of games having a fixed
 finite set of players. Regardless of its suitability for the representation of
 small-numbers conflict, this emphasis on enumerating all the players and their
 actions, one by one, makes the study of anonymous individualistic behavior
 awkward. Microeconomics is full of elegant and persuasive arguments about the
 behavior of representative firms and representative consumers in competitive
 markets in general, but in contrast it requires a great deal of elaborate computa-
 tion to show that even a simple model of noncooperative exchange yields
 competitive outcomes when there are many traders (cf. [10]). This situation
 suggests that an alternative representation of noncooperative games from the
 finite-player representation is needed as a basis for competitive theory.
 Such an alternative representation is provided by Schmeidler's [12] model of
 an anonymous noncooperative strategic-form game with a nonatomic measure
 space of players. This model is a noncooperative analogue of the nonatomic
 model of the core of an exchange economy due to Aumann [1]. Just as Aumann's
 model provides a formal setting in which the core and the Walras equilibrium set
 'I would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Donald Brown, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ariel Rubenstein, Hugo
 Sonnenschein, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions.
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 exactly coincide, so Schmeidler's model provides a setting in which (at least
 relative to the set of allocations which involve active trade on all markets) Walras
 equilibrium coincides with noncooperative equilibrium for a fairly wide class of
 games (cf. [3]). Moreover, it can be shown in this setting that the objections
 which may be brought against strategic form as a representation of small-
 numbers conflict are irrelevant to competitive situations (cf. [5]). Thus Schmeid-
 ler's model appears to be an excellent foundation for competitive theory.
 There is a problem about the use of Schmeidler's model, though, which is that
 the noncooperative analogue of Edgeworth's conjecture may fail. Sequences of
 larger and larger finite games can be constructed such that (a) these sequences
 intuitively have limits which are nonatomic games having only Walrasian nonco-
 operative equilibrium allocations but (b) there are sequences of noncooperative
 equilibrium allocations of the finite games which converge to highly noncom-
 petitive allocations in the limit (cf. [5, 11]). Given this phenomenon of "dis-
 continuity at infinity," the assumption of a continuum of players might be
 suspect. Fortunately, however, the phenomenon is limited in scope. For particu-
 lar classes of games, Dubey, Mas-Colell, and Shubik [3] and Green [5] have
 shown that there are conditions under which the equilibria of a sequence of
 games in which a finite set of players is replicated will converge to equilibria of
 the nonatomic limit game. General theorems about this convergence of equilibria
 are set forth in the present paper. The immediate purpose of these theorems is to
 provide widely applicable and easily understandable and verifiable criteria for
 when a noncooperative model of competition may appropriately be studied in
 the continuum-of-players setting.
 This work on convergence of equilibria will closely parallel the study of the
 corresponding problem in core theory. In particular, two devices which origi-
 nated in that study will be adapted to noncooperative equilibrium here. One of
 these is the restatement of the original problem of convergence as a question
 about the upper hemicontinuity of an equilibrium correspondence defined on a
 topological space of games. This formulation is due to Kannai [8]. The other
 device is the use of a statistical description of strategy vectors in order to provide
 a dimension-free comparison between games with different numbers of players.
 This statistical treatment of allocations of an exchange economy is due to
 Hildenbrand and his associates, and is exposited in [7]. The analogous statistical
 description of a noncooperative game will be called its "statistical image."
 These two devices will be combined by the use of an abstract representation of
 a game in the spirit of Debreu [2], to be called a pseudogame. Both strategic-
 form games and their statistical images are examples of pseudogames. The
 introduction of pseudogames enables Theorem 1, which asserts that the equilib-
 rium correspondence of a topological space has a closed graph, to be stated very
 easily and proved in a transparent way. With this fact in hand, it is a routine
 matter to state sufficient conditions for the correspondence to be upper hemi-
 continuous. Theorem 1 and its corollary closely resemble an earlier result of
 Walker [13], which is itself a generalization of Berge's Maximum Theorem.
 Theorem 2 will verify that the statistical image of a game is a faithful
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 representation. That is, when the game and its image are both regarded as
 pseudogames, a joint probability measure on players' characteristics and strate-
 gies is an equilibrium of the image if and only if it is the statistical distribution of
 an equilibrium strategy vector of the original game. This theorem justifies the use
 of Hildenbrand's device as the basis on which to formulate Theorem 3, a specific
 version of the upper-hemicontinuity theorem for spaces of games in which the
 number of players may increase to infinity. The conclusion of this paper explains
 in detail how Theorem 3 may be applied to show the validity of Schmeidler's
 nonatomic model to represent competitive environments as noncooperative
 games.
 2. MEASURE-THEORETIC PRELIMINARIES
 Games in strategic form (also called normal form by some authors) with a
 measure space of players will be introduced in the next section. These include
 finite-player games (or, equivalently, games of which the measure on players has
 finite support), and also include the nonatomic games of Schmeidler [12]. For the
 remainder of the paper T and S will be assumed to be complete separable metric
 spaces, as will a set N of players. Some measure-theoretic preliminaries are now
 taken care of.
 R1 denotes the real numbers. X denotes Lebesgue measure on 1R.
 The Borel a-algebra of X is the smallest a-algebra containing the open sets of
 X. A function f: X -- Y is Borel measurable if the inverse image of every Borel
 subset of Y is a Borel subset of X. yX will denote the set of Borel-measurable
 functions from X to Y. Set and function quantifiers range over Borel sets and
 over Borel-measurable functions, respectively.
 A Borel measure on X is a nonnegative, real-valued, countably additive set
 function on the Borel a-algebra of X. If m is a Borel measure on X and -d is a
 metric on Y, then the topology on yX of convergence in m-measure is generated
 by the subbasic sets U(f, q, r), where f E Yx, q > 0, and r > 0. U(f, q, r) is
 defined by Vf' E yX f' E U(f, q, r) m({x I d(f(x), f'(x))> q}) < r.
 If X is a separable metric space, then M(X) will denote the set of Borel
 measures on X. By [4, Exercise 111.9.22], every m E M(X) is regular. I.e., for
 every B C X and r > 0 there exists a closed H C X and an open U C X such
 that H C B c U and m(U) - m(H) < r. It follows from [4, Theorem IV.6.2]
 that M(X) under the total-variation norm is isometrically embeddable in the
 dual space C*(X) of the Banach space of bounded, continuous, real-valued
 functions on X. If X is compact, then M(X) is isometrically isomorphic to the
 positive cone of C*(X) by [4, Theorem 111.5.13].
 M(X) will be regarded as a subspace of C*(X) under the weak* topology.
 This topology is generated by the subbasic open sets W(f, q, r), where f E
 C(X), q EC R and r > 0. W(f,q,r) is defined by Vm E M(X) m E W(f,q, r)
 Jfxfdm - ql < r.
 Suppose that X is separable. Then it is second countable. I.e., it has a
 countable base { WI, W2, ... }. For m E M(X), define Z(m) = {k I m(Wk) = O}.
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 The support of m is its image under the correspondence supp: M(X) -) X
 defined by supp(m) = X\UkEZ(m)Wk. Then supp(m) is closed, and VB C
 X, m(B) = m(B n supp(m)). Also, for every open U C X, m(U) = 0 U n
 supp(m) = 0.
 If X and Y are both separable metric spaces, then the Borel a-algebra of
 X x Y is generated by product sets B X C, where B C X and C C Y, by [9,
 Chapter 1, Theorem 1.10]. Thus, by [4, Theorem 111.11.2], a unique measure m in
 M(X x Y) is specified by the equations m(B x C) = n(B)* p(C) (where B and
 C are subsets of X and Y, respectively) if n E M(X) and p E M( Y).
 A correspondence H: X -> Y is a mapping of the topological space X to
 subsets of the space Y. H is open or closed if its graph {(x, y) IY C H(x)} is open
 or closed, respectively. H is lower hemicontinuous (l.h.c.) if {x i H(x) n U 7 0}
 is open in X for every open set U in Y. H is upper hemicontinuous (u.h.c.) if
 {x I H(x) C U} is open in X for every open set U in Y and H(x) is nonempty for
 every x in X.
 For B C X, # B denotes the cardinality of B, and the characteristic function
 of B is denoted by XB: X -> {0, 1 }. Free variables in formal statements implicitly
 are universally quantified over their appropriate domains. E.g., v C E(g) < v
 E Eg should be read as Vv C V Vg C G v C E(g) v C Eg.
 3. GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM WITH A MEASURE SPACE OF PLAYERS
 A strategic-form game is defined on a player space N, endowed with a
 measure n c M(N), and on a strategy space S. Strategy vectors are functions in
 s N, and are topologized by convergence in n-measure.
 Players' preferences in game g are specified by an open relation Pg C N X
 (S X S N)2. A player's own action is made an explicit argument of his preference,
 although this is redundant (i.e., f(i) is the strategy of player i in strategy vector f),
 because the openness requirement would otherwise force nonatomic players to be
 indifferent to unilateral changes in their own strategies.
 Feasibility of a strategy vector is defined in terms of a closed and l.h.c.
 correspondence Fg: N-> S. Fg(i) is the set of strategies feasible for player i. The
 set Vg of feasible strategy vectors in game g is defined to be the set of selections
 from Fg (i.e., strategy vectors in which almost all players are assigned feasible
 strategies). I.e.,
 (1) f C Vg n({i C NIf(i) X Fg(i)}) = .
 PROPOSITION 1: Iff C SN, then {i C NIf(i) X Fg(i)} is a Borel set.
 PROOF: Since Fg is closed and since N and S are second countable, there is a
 sequence (Uk, Wk)k =1 2 such that each Uk and Wk are open in N and S,
 respectively, and (N X S)\Fg = U =l(Uk X Wk). Hence {i E NIf(i) X Fg(i)}
 UOOl(Uk n f (Wk)). Q.E.D.
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 Player i changes a strategy vector f by changing f(i). There is for each i E N
 an alternative function ai: S X SN -_ SN, defined by
 (2) f' = ai(s, f ) f'(i) = s and Vj i f'() = f(j)
 If a strategy vector assigns to a player a strategy to which he has a preferred
 and feasible alternative, then the player will be said to have made an inadmissi-
 ble decision. Formally, define the inadmissible-decision correspondence Ig: SN
 -* N of game g by
 (3) Ig(f) = {iI3s E Fg(i) (i,s,ai(s, f), f(i), f ) E Pg}
 PROPOSITION 2: Ig(f) is a Borel set.
 PROOF: Define No = { i I n({i}) = O}. N\No is countable, so it is sufficient to
 prove that Ig(f) n No is a Borel set. Note that, for i E No, ai(s, f) is in exactly
 the same subbasic open sets of SN as f is. Thus for all s E S and i E No,
 (i,s,ai(s, f), f(i), f) E Pg (i,s, f, f(i), f) E Pg, because Pg is open. Further-
 more, {(i,s, s') (i,s, f, s', f) E Pg} is open. By second countability, this set is
 U0Il(Xk x Yk X Zk) for some sequence of open sets XkC N, Yk C S, and
 Zk C S. Define Wk {i I Fg(i) n Yk 0}. Wk is open because Fg is l.h.c.
 Ig(f) n No= {iI 3s E Fg(i) (i,s, f, f(i), f) E Pg} fn No
 00
 U ( Wk n Xk n f -(Zk )) n No.
 k= 1
 which is a Borel set. Q.E.D.
 An equilibrium point of the strategic-form game g is a strategy vector f E Vg
 such that n(Ig(f)) = 0.
 4. ANONYMOUS GAMES
 Much of economic theory concerns games in which the preference of each
 player depends only on his own decision and on aggregate or statistical informa-
 tion about the decisions of other players. In order to make sense of the notion of
 aggregate or statistical information about players, it must be specified when
 distinct players are of the same type as one another, or more generally when
 distinct players are of similar types. The type of a player refers to all of his
 characteristics which may be relevant for the analysis both of his own decision
 problem and of the decision problems of other players in the game. In particular,
 a player's type should specify his preferences and his strategic capabilities.
 Intuitively, the strategic capabilities of a player may depend on his "size," that is,
 on the mass assigned to him by the measure on the set of players. Thus a player's
 mass must be encoded in his type, and this encoding must be faithful to the mass
 actually specified by the measure on players. A strategic-form game which can
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 be described in terms of players' types will be called anonymous. Anonymous
 games are described formally in the following two paragraphs.
 A space T of player types and a space S of strategies are given. There is a
 continuous mass-revealing function b: T-> [0, 1]. The set of players is N = T x [0,
 1]. This set is endowed with a measure having the property that the mass of
 almost every player is accurately described by the mass-revealing function. The
 set G c M(N) of such measures is defined by
 (4) n E G<=>Vi E supp(n) n({i}) = b((i)),
 whereT : N-> T is projection onto T (i.e., T(t, r) = t).
 Let n EG be the measure of players in anonymous game g. To describe the
 relation of players' preferences in g to aggregate information, the statistical
 distribution of a strategy vector in V = SN is introduced. The function I/: G X_V
 -> M(D) is defined by
 (5) m = ,(n, f)¢=VX C TVY C S m(X x Y)= n(r-'(X) n f-'()).
 I.e., i(n, f) is the statistical distribution of decisions in f relative to n.
 A player's preference in g must depend only on his own strategy and on
 aggregate information, and his preference and strategy set must be functions of
 his type. That is, there must be a relation P C T x (S x M(D))2 which satisfies
 (6) (i,s', f',s, f) E Pg = (r(i),s', !(n,f),s, ') , (n, f)) E P,
 and there must be a correspondence F: T-> S which satisfies
 (7) s E Fg(i)s E F(T(i)).
 The equilibrium set Eg of g is defined (as for strategic-form games in general)
 by
 (8) f E Eg[f E Vg and n(Ig(f))= 0],
 where Vg and Ig are defined by (1) and (3), respectively.
 REMARK 1: An arbitrary strategic-form game h is equivalent to some anony-
 mous game g. Suppose that the set of players in h is N, under Borel measure m.
 Define T = N X [0, 1], and define b(i, q) = q for i e N and q E [0, 1]. Then define
 the injection v: N->N by v(i) = (i,m((i),0). The measure n EG defined by
 n(B) = m(v-(B)) is the measure of players in g. P and F are defined in a
 natural way from Ph and Fh, respectively, and then Pg and Fg are defined by (6)
 and (7). This construction has the property thatf E Eg if and only if f o v E Eh.
 This section concludes with a lemma which shows that the aggregate informa-
 tion about a strategy vector is sufficient to determine whether it is an equilibrium
 point of an anonymous game.
 LEMMA 1: If ,u(n, f) = pj(n, f') = m, then f E Eg f' E Eg.
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 PROOF: Suppose that f X Eg. By (8), either f Vg or else n(Ig(f)) > 0. It will
 be shown that f' shares the difficulty in either case, so thatf' X Eg.
 CASE 1: Assume that f Vg. I.e., n({i f(i) X Fg(i)}) > 0. From the proof of
 Proposition 1 there must be open sets U CN and W C S such that n(U n
 f-'(W)) > 0 and (Ux W) n Fg = 0. The image T(U) is open because T is a
 projection and U is open, and (T-1(r(U)) X W) n Fg = 0 by (7). Note that, by
 (5), m(T(U) x W)= n(T-'(T(U)) n f-1(W)) >n(U n f-'(W))> 0. Also
 m(( U) x W) = n(T- 1(T(U)) n f'-'(W)) by assumption, so n - ({i lf'(i)
 Fg(i)}) > m( (U) x W) > 0 and thereforef' X Vg.
 CASE 2: Assume that n(Ig(f)) > 0. Suppose first that there is a player i E Ig(f)
 such that n(i) > O. Then, by (5), m({((i)} x {f(i)}) n({i}) > 0. Thus, by (6)
 and (7), n(Ig(f')) > n(Tr-'((i)) n f'-l(f(i))) = m({(i)} X {f(i)}) > 0.
 If there is no such player i, then the proof of Proposition 2 shows that there are
 open sets (Wn X) CN and Z cS such that n(Wn X nf-(Z)) > 0 and
 W n X n f-l(Z) C Ig(f). By an argument analogous to Case 1, n(W n X n
 f'- (Z)) > 0 and W n X n f'- (Z) C Ig(f') as well.
 This argument has shown that, under the hypothesis of the lemma, f E Eg =f'
 E Eg. Since f and f' are interchangeable in the statement of the lemma, the
 converse implication holds as well. Q.E.D.
 5. VARIATION OF THE PLAYERS OF A GAME
 On a type of space T (with continuous mass-revealing function b) and a
 strategy space S, consider a preference relation P c T x (S x M(D))2 and a
 feasible-strategy correspondence F: T-> S. The pair (P,F) will be called an
 anonymous game form if it satisfies
 (9) P is open, and
 (10) F is closed and l.h.c.
 For any measure in G, P and F will determine the anonymous strategic-form
 game in a natural way. Thus an anonymous game form can serve as a basis for
 studying the type of question that was described in the Introduction.
 PROPOSITION 3: Let (P,) be an anonymous game form, and let n E G. Then
 there is an anonymous game g having n as the measure of its players, and of which
 the preference relation Pg and the feasible-strategy correspondence Fg are defined by
 (6) and (7), respectively.
 PROOF: It must be shown that Pg is open, and that Fg is closed and l.h.c.
 To show that Pg is open, define 7r:N x (S x)2-- T (S x M(D))2 by
 7T(i,s', f',s, f) = (((i),s', tJ(n, f'),s, tL(n, f)). It will be proved below, as Lemma
 2, that ji is continuous inf when V has the topology of convergence in n-measure.
 By (6), Pg = r-l(P). This inverse image is open by (9), Lemma 2, and the
 continuity of T.
 To show that Fg is closed, define 8: N S--> TX S by 8(i,s) = (r(i),s).
 Fg = 8-(F) by (7), and this inverse image is closed by (10) and the continuity
 of 8.
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 If U is open in S, then
 {ijFg,(i)n U#0}=T '((tjF(t)fn U#0}),
 which is open by (10) and continuity of T. Thus Fg is l.h.c. Q.E.D.
 LEMMA 2: Let n EG, and topologize V by convergence in n-measure. Then
 pt(n, f) is continuous as a function of f.
 PROOF: V is metrizable by [4, Lemma 111.2.7], so sequential continuity implies
 continuity of ,u with respect to f. Sequential continuity follows from [4, Corollary
 111-.6.13] (convergence in measure implies convergence almost everywhere) and
 [4, Corollary 111.6.16] (Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem). Q.E.D.
 REMARK 2: Proposition 3 formalizes the idea that the rules of a game may be
 defined without specifying the set of players (i.e., the support of n) or even the
 number of players who will participate. Such institutions as elections and
 auctions fit this description.
 6. EQUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCES AND PSEUDOGAMES
 Given an anonymous game form, one would like to study the correspondence
 from G to V which assigns, to each measure n E G, the equilibrium set Eg of the
 anonymous game g described in Proposition 3. However, it is awkward to study
 this correspondence directly. The problem is that, while V is defined unambigu-
 ously (regardless of n) as a set of functions, it has not been endowed with a
 unique topology. Rather V has been topologized by convergence in n-measure,
 and this topology varies with n itself. Consequently, one cannot even formulate
 questions about the topological properties of the correspondence just described.
 However, it is possible to study a correspondence which assigns the set
 ,u({n} >x Eg) to n. By Lemma 1, this new correspondence completely determines
 the correspondence from n to Eg. Moreover, the new correspondence maps G
 into M(D), and M(D) is topologized by weak* convergence which does not
 depend on n. Thus it makes good sense to ask whether this correspondence is
 closed or u.h.c.
 The remainder of the paper is devoted to carrying out this program. An
 abstract representation of a single anonymous game (to be called a pseudogame)
 will be defined in the present section, and an abstract representation of an
 anonymous game form (to be called a topological family of pseudogames) will be
 introduced in the next section. In Section 8 it will be proved that the equilibrium
 correspondence of a topological family is always closed (Theorem 1), and a
 sufficient condition for the correspondence to be u.h.c. will be provided. In
 Section 9, the statistical image of an anonymous game form will be introduced
 and will be shown to be a topological family having the equilibrium correspon-
 dence described above (Theorem 2). In Section 10, these results will be combined
 to prove a sharper statement about the equilibrium correspondence of an
 anonymous game form (Theorem 3), which is the main result of the paper.
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 The definition of a pseudogame is now given. A pseudogame is defined in terms
 of a set T of player types, a set S of strategies, and a set V of strategy vectors.
 These sets will all be assumed to be topological spaces. A strategy choice by a
 player type is a decision. A strategy choice made in the context of a strategy
 vector is a circumstance. Formally, let D = T X S and C = S x V denote the set
 of decisions and the set of circumstances, respectively. These (and other product
 sets to be introduced) are topologized as product spaces.
 Let g be a game. Each player type in g has a preference relation over
 circumstances. The preference relations of all player types are jointly described
 by a relation Pg C TX C2. The interpretation of (t,c', c) Pg is that players of
 type t strictly prefer circumstance c' to circumstance c. However, no formal
 restrictions (e.g., that the preference relation of each type is transitive) are placed
 on Pg.
 Players can change their circumstances by changing their decisions. Their
 ability to do this is described by an alternative correspondence Ag: T X C-> C.
 That (s', v') Ag(t, [s, v]) means that, if a single player of type t were to change
 his strategy choice from s to s' when the strategy vector was v, that strategy
 vector would be changed to v'. A decision is inadmissable if the player making it
 has neglected a preferred alternative. Formally, define the inadmissible-decision
 correspondence Ig: V- D by
 (11) (t,s) E Ig(v)=3c [c E Ag(t, [s, v]) and (t,c, [s,v]) E Pg].
 Each strategy vector results from a combination of strategy choices. These are
 specified by a correspondence Jg: V->D. The interpretation of (t, s) E Jg(v) is
 that, in strategy vector v, at least one player of type t has chosen strategy s.
 In order to compare several different games, we will have to embed their
 spaces of strategy vectors in a common space. Thus, for any particular game
 being considered, not every strategy vector in the common space V will be
 feasible. A subset Fg C V specifies the feasible strategy vectors in game g.
 An equilibrium point is a feasible strategy vector in which no inadmissible
 decisions are made. Formally, the equilibrium set Eg C V of game g is defined by
 (12) v E Eg [v E Fg and Ig(v) n Jg(v) = 0].
 7. TOPOLOGICAL FAMILIES OF PSEUDOGAMES
 Consider a topological space G, the points of which are pseudogames. Suppose
 that these are all defined on the same triple of spaces T, S, and V. The
 characterization of pseudogames in G may be consolidated into a single relation
 P C G x TX C2 and correspondences F: G- V. A: G X T X C- C, and J:
 Gx V- D. Thus
 (g,t,c',c) E P=>(t,c',c) E Pg, v E F(g) v E Fg
 and so forth. The inadmissible-decision correspondence I: G x V-> D is
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 defined by
 (13) (t,s) E I(g,v)>3c [c E A(g,t, [s,v]) and (g,t,c, [s,v]) C P].
 The equilibrium correspondence E: G -o V is defined by
 (14) v E E(g){[v E F(g) and I(g,v) n J(g,v) = 0].
 Clearly v E E(g)>= v C Eg by equations (9)-(13).
 A topological family of pseudogames is specified by a relation P and correspon-
 dences F, A, and J which satisfy
 (15) P is open,
 (16) F is closed,
 (17) A is lower hemicontinuous, and
 (18) J is lower hemicontinuous.
 8. THE EQUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCE OF A TOPOLOGICAL FAMILY
 In this section it will be shown that the equilibrium correspondence of a
 topological family of pseudogames is always closed, and a sufficient condition
 will be established for such a correspondence to be upper hemicontinuous. These
 results closely resemble those of Walker [13].
 LEMMA 3: Let X and Y be two arbitrary topological spaces. If H: X -* Y is open
 and K: X - Y is l.h.c., then
 W= {xIH(x) n K(x) #=0}
 is open.
 PROOF: Suppose that x E W and that y C H(x) n K(x). Since H is open,
 there are neighborhoods U of x and Z of y such that U x Z C H. Since k is
 l.h.c., the set
 V= {vEXIK(v)fn Z#0}
 is a neighborhood of x. W is open, then, because x (which is an arbitrary element
 of W) satisfies x E U n v c W. Q.E.D.
 LEMMA 4: The inadmissible-decision correspondence of a topological family is
 open.
 PROOF: DefineH:Gx TX C -Cby
 c' E H(g,t,c)@*(g,t,c',C) E P.
 To apply Lemma 3, let K= A. By (13), (15), and Lemma 3,
 W= {(g,d,v) J H(g,d,v) n A(g,d,v) #- 0}
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 is open. Since
 d E I(g,v) (g,d,v) E W,
 I is open. Q.E.D.
 THEOREM 1: The equilibrium correspondence of a topological family is closed.
 PROOF: It will be proved that (G x V)\E is open. Define
 W= {(g, v) I(g,v) n J(g,v) - 0}.
 By (12), (G x V)\E = W U (V\F). Since F is closed by (14), it is sufficient to
 show that W is open. Letting H = I and K = J in Lemma 3, this is immediate by
 Lemma 4 and (16). Q.E.D.
 COROLLARY: If E is nonempty valued and F is u.h.c. and compact valued, then
 E is u.h.c.
 PROOF: This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and [7, Chapter 1,
 Proposition B.III.2]. Q.E.D.
 Four examples are now provided which show that Theorem 1 would not be
 valid (i.e., that E might not be closed) if (13)-(16) were not required. In each
 example, T is an arbitrary space and G = S = V = R. Z will denote {(r,r) r
 E R}.
 EXAMPLE 1: P is not open. Define P = ((g, t, c, [s, v]) I v = g, F(g) = V, A(g,
 t,c) = C, and J(g,v) = T X {v). Then E = R2\Z.
 EXAMPLE 2: F is not closed. Define P = 0, F(g) = V\{ g}, A (g, t, c) = C, and
 J(g, v) = T x {v). Then E = IR2\Z.
 EXAMPLE 3: A is not l.h.c. Define P = G x T x C2, F(g) = V,
 A(g,t,c)=- if g0
 and J(g,v) = T x v}). Then E = R2\(0)} X R).
 EXAMPLE 4: J is not l.h.c. Define P = G x Tx C2, F(g)= V, A(g,t,c)= C,
 and
 J(g, x 0 v if g-O, J ( Tx v) if g=0.
 Then E = R2\({}) x R).
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 These pathologies can be exhibited also in topological families, the elements of
 which are derived from strategic-form games in which the players have rational
 preferences.
 9. THE STATISTICAL IMAGE OF AN ANONYMOUS GAME FORM
 The statistical image of an anonymous game form (P, F) is a topological family
 of pseudogames (G, T, S, V, P, F, A, J). T and S are the type and strategy spaces
 of (P, F). G is the set of measures in M(T) which are the distribution of T for
 some measure in G. I.e., G is the set of g E M(T) which satisfy
 (19) 3n C G VB C T g(B) = n(T-'(B)).
 V is the set of distributions of decisions in strategy vectors of games in (P, F). I.e.,
 V C M(D) is the image of G x V under It. P, F, A, and J are now defined by
 conditions (20)-(23). In the statement of (21) and (22), F is regarded as a subset
 of T x S in the natural way.
 (20) (g,t,c',c) E P=(t,c',C) EP p
 (21) v C F(g) [supp(v) C F and VB c Tv(B X S) = g(B)],
 (22) (g,t, [s',v'], [s,v]) E A @(t,s') E Fand VB c D
 v'(B) = v(B) + b(t)(XB (t,s') XB (t, s))],
 and
 (23) J( g, v) = supp(v).
 PROPOSITION 4: The statistical image of an anonymous game form is a topologi-
 cal family.
 Conditions (13)-(16) must be verified to prove Proposition 4. This verification
 requires some knowledge about open sets in M(D), which is now given in
 Lemma 5. For X a separable metric space, U open in X, and r E R, define
 W+ (U,r) = {m E M(X) I m(U) > r} and
 W - (U, r) = { m E M(X) I m(cl(U)) < r}.
 LEMMA 5: The sets W+ (U, r) and W- (U, r) are open in M(X).
 PROOF: To show that W + (U, r) is open, suppose that m E W + (U, r). A
 subbasic open set W(f, q, q') will be found such that m E W(f, q, q') C W + (U,
 r). Since X is a separable metric space, there exist closed sets H1 C H2 c *
 such that U- I Hk= U. By Urysohn's Lemma [4, Theorem 1.5.2], for each k
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 there is a continuous function fk : X -> R such that XH, < fk < X. By Lebesgue's
 Dominated Convergence Theorem [4, Corollary 111.6.16], fxfkdm > r for some
 k. Then
 m e W(fk, fkdm,jfkdm -r) c W+ (U,r).
 Suppose now that m E W (U, r). Define q = (r - m(cl(U)))/2. Then
 m E W(x,m (X),q) n W+ (X\cl(U),m(X\cl(U))- q)
 C W- (U,r). Q.E,D.
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: P = G XP by (20). This is open in G X T x C2 by
 (9), so (13) holds.
 To verify (14), it must be shown that if v ~ F(g), then some neighborhood
 (g, v) in G x V is disjoint from F (i.e., from the graph of F). By (21),
 F = {(g', ') E G x Vl supp(v') _ F}
 n[ n {(g, ')EGX Vv'(BXS)=g'(B)}]
 First suppose that supp(v) ~ F. Then D \F is open by (10) and v(D \F) > 0, so
 (G x W + (D \F, 0)) n F = 0. Second, suppose that v(B X S) - g(B). To begin,
 suppose that v(B X S) > g(B). By regularity of g, there is an open U C T with
 B C U and g(U) < v(B X S) < v(U x S). Since T is a separable metric space,
 there is a closed H c U such that g(U) < v(H x S). By Urysohn's lemma, there
 is a continuous f: T-> R with XH < f< Xu Define f': D -> R by f(t, s) = f(t),
 and define r > 0 by r = (fDf'dv - f fdg)/2. Then
 (g,v) E (f, fdg, r) X W(f',f'dv, r) C (M(T) x M(D))\F,
 since Tfdg = fDf'dv if v E F(g).
 Alternatively, suppose that v(B X S) < g(B). Then either v((T\B) x S)>
 g(T\B) (in which case it has just been shown that (g,v) 4 cl(F)), or else
 v(D) < g(T) (in which case
 + (T,(g(T) + v(D))/2) x W- (D, (g(T) + v(D ))/2) n F= 0).
 Thus (g, v) E cl(F) if v(B X S) # g(B), establishing (14).
 Now it will be shown that A is l.h.c. Suppose that U' C S is open, that
 W(f, q, r) C M(D), and that
 (s',v) EA(g,, , [s,v]) n (U' X W(f,q,r)).
 Assume without loss of generality that Df dv' = q. Note that s' EF(t) by (22). If
 Xu = {x E TIF(x) n U 7 0) for U C U' open, then Xu is open by (10). For
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 x E Xu, u E U, y E S, and m E W(v, Df dv, r/2),
 (24) [fdm + b(x)(f(x, u) -f(x y))] -jfdv'
 < r/2 + Ib(x)(f(x,u) -f(x, y)) - b(t)(f(t,s') -f(t,s))l.
 Neighborhoods U c U' of s', X C Xu of t and Y C S of y can be chosen so that
 the right hand side of (24) is less than r on
 W(v, fdv,r/2) x X x UX Y
 by continuity of b and f. Thus for any
 (g°,t°,s°,v°) e G x X x Y x ( W(v, fdv,r/2)n V
 A(g, t, s°,v°) n (U' x W(f,q,r)) = 0.
 I.e., (15) holds.
 To show that J is l.h.c., let U C D be open and suppose that d E J(g, v) n U.
 Since d E supp(v), v(U) > O, so v E W+(U,O). Also, if m(U) > O for any
 m E M(D), then supp(m) n U # 0. Thus
 G x(W+(U,O)n V) c (g',v') F(g',v')n U: 0),
 so (16) is established. Q.E.D.
 If n EG and g E G are related by (19), then g is naturally associated with the
 game in (P,F) determined by n. The equivalence between the equilibria of the
 strategic-form game determined by n and the pseudogame determined by g will
 be proved as Theorem 2. The proof requires several lemmas.
 LEMMA 6: If g E G, then there are measures go and g1 in M(T) such that (i) go
 is nonatomic and supp(go) c b-'({0}), (ii) there is a sequence (possibly with
 repetitions) t1, t2, . . . in T such that, for all B C T,
 00
 gl(B) = b(tk)XB(tk),
 k=1
 and (iii) g = go + g1.
 PROOF: Since g E G, there is a measure n G such that n and g satisfy (19).
 By (4), n has no atoms in b-l({O)) X [0, 1], and supp(n) n (b-((O, 1)) X [0, 1]) is
 a countable set. Let i1,i2, . . . be an enumeration of this set. For all k,
 n({ik}) = b(T(ik)). Define tk = T(ik) and let g1 be defined by (ii). Define go = g -
 g,, so that (i) and (iii) hold. Q.E.D.
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 LEMMA 7: If v c V, then there are measures vo and v, in M(D) such that (i) vo
 is nonatomic and supp(vo) C b -'({0}) X S, (ii) there is a sequence (possibly with
 repetitions) d1,d2, ... in D such that, if dk = (tk,sk),
 00
 VB CD v1(B) = E b(tk)XB (dk),
 k = 1
 and (iii) v = v0 + V1.
 PROOF: Let v = pt(n, f), and let i', i2, ... be the atoms of n. Define tk = T(ik)
 and Sk = f(ik). Then v1 is defined by (ii), and (i) and (iii) are satisfied by
 vO= v-v1. Q.E.D.
 LEMMA 8: If v E F(g), then there exist n CG and f E V such that (i) n and g
 satisfy (19), and (ii) v = ,u(n, f). In fact, a function f satisfying (ii) exists for any n
 satisfying (i).
 PROOF: If tl, t2, . . . is the sequence described in Lemma 6, then by (21) there
 must be 1S 92 ... such that (t1 , s1), (t2, S2), ... is the sequence described in
 Lemma 7. Define n1 e M(N) by
 00
 VB C N n,(B ) = E b(tk)XB (tk 9 1 /k).
 k = I
 Define nO e M(N) by VX C T V Y C [O, 1] no(X x Y) = go(X) * X(Y), where go is
 as in Lemma 6. Then n = nO + n, satisfies (i). To define f, first set f(tk, I/k) = Sk.
 Second, define a function h : No- S such that vo = It(no, h) by the method used
 in the proof of [7, Proposition 11.2.2.6] (originally proved by Hart, Hildenbrand,
 and Kohlberg [6] to assign an allocation to a distribution), and set f = h on
 b -1({0}). Now f has been defined everywhere on supp(n), so (ii) is satisfied
 regardless of what value it is assigned elsewhere.
 This construction of f works for any n c G such that n and g satisfy (19). In
 particular, the proof appealed to in [7] requires only that no be a nonatomic
 measure on N, although it is stated only for nO = go *A. However, the assumption
 that T and S are complete metric spaces is required in order for that proof to be
 applied. Q.E.D.
 LEMMA 9: If n and g satisfy (19), (s',v') E A(g,t,[s,v]), v= ,u(n, f), and
 t E supp(g), then there exists a player i EE T- (t) for whom v' = p4an,ai(s', f)).
 PROOF: This follows from (2), (22), and (4). Q.E.D.
 REMARK 3: Crucial use has been made here of condition (4) defining G. It has
 been necessary to define A in terms of the mass-revealing function b in order to
 assure lower hemicontinuity. Lemma 9 holds because (4) guarantees that this
 definition will be appropriate for almost all players.
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 THEOREM 2: If v e V, n and g satisfy (19), Eg is defined by (8) for the game in
 (P,) in which n is the measure of players, and E(g) is defined by (12) for the
 statistical image of (fj), then the following are equivalent:
 (i) v e E(g),
 (ii) 3f EjV [f EEgandv = (n,f)]
 (iii) btf E V [ (n, f) = v =wf E EJ].
 PROOF: That (i) and (ii) are equivalent is a consequence of Lemma 8, and of a
 comparison of (12) and (8) using Lemma 9. That (ii) and (iii) are equivalent
 follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 8. Q.E.D.
 10. THE EQUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCE
 OF AN ANONYMOUS GAME FORM
 By the equilibrium correspondence of an anonymous game form is meant the
 equilibrium correspondence of its statistical image. The graph of this correspon-
 dence is now studied as a subset of M(T) X M(D). The first step is to describe G
 as a subset of M(T) and V as a subset of M(D).
 LEMMA 10: The measure g E M(T) is in G if and only if Vt E supp(g)
 [b(t) > 0=-g({t})/b(t) is a strictly positive integer]. The measure v E M(D) is in
 V if and only if V(t,s) E supp(v) [b(t) > 0=X v({(t,s)})/b(t) is a strictly positive
 integer].
 PROOF: Suppose that Vt e supp(g) [b(t) > 0 = g({ t})/b(t) is a strictly posi-
 tive integer], Then there is an enumeration (possibly with repetitions) tI, t2, .
 of b-'((0, 1]) n supp(g) such that, for all t e b-'((O, 1]), *rkI t = tk} = g({t})
 /b(t). Define n1 E M(N) by
 00
 n,(X) = E b(tk)Xx(tk, Il1k),
 k = I
 Define go e M(T) by
 go(B ) = g(B n b- (o))F)
 define no E M(N) by
 VXCT VYC[0,1] no(XX Y)=go(X)X(Y),
 and define n = nO + n1. Then n -G, and n and g satisfy (19), so g E G. The
 converse implication follows from Lemma 6.
 The proof of the equivalence for v E M(D) is analogous, using Lemma 7 and
 Lemma 8. Q.E.D.
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 LEMMA 1 1: G is closed in M( T). V is closed in M(D).
 PROOF: Suppose that m E M(T)\G. By Lemma 10, for some t E b'-((0, 1]) n
 supp(m), either m(t) = 0 or else k < m({t})/b(t) < k + 1 for some integer k. If
 m({t}) = 0, then there is a neighborhood U of t such that m(cl(U)) < inf{b(u) I u
 E U) = r, by continuity of b, regularity of m and normality of T [4, Theorem
 1.6.3]. Thus W + (U, 0) n W - (U, r) is a neighborhood of m disjoint from G, by
 Lemma 10.
 Alternatively, suppose that k < m({ t})/b(t) < k + 1. Then there are real
 numbers q < b(t) < r such that kr < m({t}) < (k + 1)q. There is a neighbor-
 hood U of t with U C b - 1((q, r)) and m(cl(U)) < (k + 1)q. Then W + (U, kr) n
 W - (U, (k + 1)q) is a neighborhood of m disjoint from G, by Lemma 10.
 The proof that V is closed in M(D) is analogous. Q.E.D.
 THEOREM 3: The equilibrium correspondence of an anonymous game form is
 closed in M(T) X M(D). If E is nonempty valued, T is compact and F is u.h.c. and
 compact valued, then E is upper hemicontinuous as a correspondence from G to V.
 PROOF: The first assertion is immediate from Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and
 Lemma 11. The second assertion will be derived from the corollary of Theo-
 rem 1.
 It may be assumed without loss of generality that S =F(T). By [7, Chapter 1,
 Proposition B.III.3], S is then compact. Thus M(D) is the positive cone of
 C*(D), and hence is closed in C*(D). Since every measure in F(g) has the same
 total variation as g does, F is compact valued by Alaoglu's theorem [4, Corollary
 V.4.3].
 It remains to be shown that F is u.h.c. By [7, Chapter 1, Theorem B.III.1], it is
 sufficient to show that if g1, g2, ... is any sequence in G which converges to a
 measure g in G, and if vI, v2, ... is any sequence in V such that vk E F(gk) for
 all k, then there is a strategy vector v E F( g) such that a subsequence vI , v2,. .
 converges to v. For sufficiently large k, vk(D) < g(T) + 1. Thus, by Alaoglu's
 theorem, the tail of the sequence vI, v2, ... lies in a compact subset of M(D), so
 a subsequence converges to a measure v E M(D). By Lemma 11, v E V. By
 Theorem 2, v E F(g).
 The upper hemicontinuity of E now follows from the corollary of Theorem 1.
 Q.E.D.
 11. CONCLUSION: APPLICATION TO MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
 Most of the institutions studied in economics are anonymous in character, and
 can be modelled as anonymous game forms. Often these institutions are not
 incentive compatible when they are populated by few agents, but they become so
 (i.e., their noncooperative equilibria achieve competitive allocations) asymptoti-
 cally as the number of agents increases. This phenomenon has been studied by
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 considering sequences n1, n2, . . . of probability measures, such that each nk has
 finite support Hk and #Hk-* o, in the space G of an anonymous game form.
 The sequences which reflect the effects of the presence of many players, rather
 than of the change of players' types, are those which converge in the sense that
 they are uniformly tight [9, Chapter 2, Theorem 6.7] and that, for every
 neighborhood U C T, ZiCHkXU(T(i))/# Hk converges. Given a sequence fi,
 f2, . . . in V, such that fk is an equilibrium of the game with player space nk, it
 may be asked (cf. [10]) whether the allocations resulting from these strategy
 vectors in their respective games are asymptotically competitive.
 An alternative method of study has been developed in [3] and in [5]. Rather
 than studying the sequences just described directly, this method involves study-
 ing the equilibrium sets E( g) where supp( g) c b - 1({ 0)) in the statistical image
 of the anonymous game form. These measures g correspond via (19) to non-
 atomic measures in G, among which the limits of the sequences n1 , n2, ... must
 lie. (N.B. limits are defined in terms of the measures gk E G associated with nk by
 (19), since G itself is not closed. A limit in this sense must exist by [9, Chapter 1,
 Theorem 6.1, Theorem 6.7].)
 Theorem 3 is used to infer the asymptotic competitiveness of the equilibrium
 outcomes of sequences of finite-player games, if all equilibrium allocations of
 nonatomic games in the anonymous game form are exactly competitive. This
 approach is convenient because (i) it removes the necessity to make explicit
 approximations, and (ii) the nonatomicity of the player spaces dealt with can be
 exploited as in Proposition 2 here. However, it sacrifices the quantitative esti-
 mates of the divergence of finite-player noncooperative outcomes from competi-
 tive allocations which the direct approach provides.
 Finally, it should be pointed out that the continuity conditions (17) and (18) in
 the definition of an anonymous game form may sometimes be restrictive. These
 conditions typically are satisfied by models of quantity-setting competition such
 as those studied in [3, 5, and 10], but the model studied in [11] and an example
 provided in [5] shows that this satisfication is not automatic. Models in a spirit of
 Bertrand competition or of auction bidding, such as that proposed in [14],
 typically do not satisfy the conditions. These examples suggest the scope of
 application of the results presented here.
 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.
 Manuscript received June, 1982; final revision received September, 1983.
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